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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the detectability and robustness of packet length covert channels. We
discovered that packet length covert channels, where a rogue user modulates the length of a
Transport Control Protocol packet, can be detected while monitoring traffic of a large network.
The bandwidth of these channels can be successfully estimated as well as the channels
themselves detected using statistical inference.
In addition, we observed that there is an inverse relationship between the volitionality in net-
works with respect to packet lengths and the detectability of these channels, and between packet
length and channel bandwidth. For a large network like a college department, the bandwidth of
a covert channel could be in the tens of megabytes over the course of a day.
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Cryptology predates digital computing by approximately 3000 years, but modern information
systems offer opportunities and pose challenges to communicating secretly. It is not uncommon
for users to want to keep even the fact that they are communicating secret. Keeping secret the
fact that you are communicating is increasingly difficult due to layered network defenses in
which traffic monitoring and analysis takes place. To avoid detection, users can employ covert
channel techniques. The covertness of such channels results from modulating characteristics of
information systems that were not intended for communications in order to transmit informa-
tion.
1.1 Research Questions
From a detection standpoint, covert channels pose a challenge. Many types of covert channels
implemented on top of Internet traffic exist but, in this thesis, we will treat only channels that
modulate the packet length in network traffic. This thesis addresses the following questions:
How can a packet length covert channel be detected?
Some research has already been conducted on detecting packet length covert channels. How-
ever, these efforts are directed at individual connections. Can these channels be detected in large
scale networks? Packet lengths in normal network traffic exhibit predictable patterns, with lots
of traffic in the short and long lengths. In this thesis, we use statistical methods to attempt to
detect packet length covert channels at a network-wide level.
What is the bandwidth of a packet length covert channel?
It is worthwhile for both the covert user and the network owner to know the bandwidth of a
potential covert channel. From the covert user’s perspective, it is good to know how much data
can be transmitted, while from the administrator’s perspective, it is important to know the data
rate at which exfiltration can occur.
1
1.2 Thesis Roadmap
To start with, we will discuss previous research on covert channels. This covers covert clas-
sifications of curent channels and methods of detecting them. We outline some of the current
research specifically related to packet length covert channels.
Next, we outline a packet length covert channel we developed by modifying the Linux kernel.
This modification allows network packets being sent by a legitimate user to be modulated for
the channel’s purposes without any knowledge of the user. This modulation does not modify
any of the data sent by the legitimate user.
Chapter 4 will describe the statistical techniques used to detect packet length covert channels.
The techniques are general statistical methods using standard deviations and averaging. The
methods are then tied together to also estimate the bandwidth of the covert channel. The next
chapter outlines the framework for the experiments and testing of the equations from Chapter
4. The experiments use collected network traffic from an entire school department of several
hundred users and use injected traffic to simulate a covert channel.
A large amount of network traffic was collected for analysis. Chapter 6 presents the analysis of
all the data to determine how accurate Chapter 3’s framework was. Lastly, we suggest future
research to include how to improve the covert channel’s robustness, as well as how to refine the





In 1973, Butler Lampson characterized covert channels as unintended pathways for informa-
tion transfer [1]. These channels typically use storage and timing characteristics of the sys-
tem to bypass security measures and transmit information covertly. Although they tend to be
low-bandwidth, covert channels provide adequate communication resources for exploiting and
attacking computing systems, as evidenced by their use in rootkits and botnets [2].
2.2 Why Use Covert Channels?
Covert channels offer users methods to communicate and transmit information that is not often
monitored by current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or that is very difficult to detect. Users
in need of this kind of secrecy include both State and non-State actors. These users need the
confidentiality that encryption offers, but they also need something more. Their central need is
to maintain the fact that they are communicating. It is easy to detect if a user is communicating
even if the user is using encryption, especially if the detector is an administrator or has direct
access to the communications medium.
A covert channel scenario can be illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma Problem introduced by
Simmons in 1983 [3]. There are two prisoners in separate cells who want to talk to each other
and have already agreed on the protocol of their covert communications. All messages must
first be screened by the warden who either drops the message, forwards the message, or makes
a modification before forwarding. The two prisoners then communicate by sending seemingly
harmless messages on an overt channel that have hidden content encoded in them [3], [4]. For
instance, the signaling could consist of varying the days that the prisoner sends a message or
the number of words that he puts on a single page. One major factor in these scenarios is that
the covert channel is dependent on an overt channel. The covert channel cannot exist otherwise,
and its bandwidth is directly tied to the bandwidth of the overt channel. Figure 2.1 shows a
model covert channel in which Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver [5]. Alice modulates
the overt message with the covert message and sends it. Bob then receives the message and
extracts the covert message from the overt message. Figure 2.1 also shows how someone in the
middle (Wendy) could modify the overt channel.
3
Figure 2.1: Covert Channel Model
2.3 High-Assurance Systems
Covert channels are of concern in high-assurance systems. Developers of such systems should
attempt to identify and limit the bandwidth of such channels. In these systems, a covert channel
is classified as either a:
Storage Channel: One process, the sender, directly or indirectly writes to a storage location
while the second process directly or indirectly reads from the same location
Timing Channel: The sender modulates the timing of a system resource in a way that affects
the response time as viewed by a second process
The Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) required analysis for storage
channels and timing channels in order to meet B2 and above certifications [6].
An example of each type of channel is illustrated in the following scenario. Assume two pro-
cesses are operating on a multilevel security (MLS) system with one at a high security level
and the other operating at a low level. If the high process could modulate the intensity of its
execution in such a way as to deny the processor to the low-level process, the high process
could modulate the denial of the processor to transmit information to the low process. This
assumes the system does not give equal time slots to each process or that the system does not
give priority to the low process.
For storage channels, assume both processes have access to the same memory partition. First,
the low process will try to write to the partition at regular intervals and will get an error from
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the system if the disk is full. Second, the high process fills up the partition and deletes from it.
The low partition will get an error message when the high partition fills up the partition.
Three major methods exist to detect covert channels in high-assurance systems [7]:
Noninterference: The user analyzes process interactions to see if one process can interact or
interfere with another process. If one process can interfere with another, then a covert
channel exists. This is used to uncover primarily storage covert channels.
Shared Resource Matrix (SRM): Develop a matrix of all resources on one side and on the
other all the processes. Then, determine which process uses which resource and whether it
writes, reads, or modifies the resource. A covert channel can develop where two processes
share certain properties on the same resource. This method can be used for identifying
both timing and storage channels [8].
Information Flow Analysis: Analyze kernel system calls and variables that are accessible by
users. The user must determine if two processes can view or alter any of these variables
using exceptions or the system calls. This method is similar to that of the SRM.
Covert channels have also been created by modulating packet timing, data and headers of net-
work traffic. With the proliferation of network protocols and network traffic since Lampson first
defined covert channel, this is an area ripe for research. Gigabit LANs and broadband connec-
tions are becoming widespread. If a major server were to be compromised, an attacker would
only need one bit per packet to covertly transmit upwards of 26GB of data per year [9].
2.4 Network-Based Covert Channels
A broader definition of covert channel has also emerged with network traffic. This broader
definition includes any attempt to hide information in network protocols and refers to that infor-
mation as hidden or covert information. This contrasts with methods like steganography, which
refers to hiding information in content [4]. In this thesis, we use the broader definition of covert
channel to refer to any manipulation of network timing or protocols to transmit information.
One of the simpler methods of creating such a covert channel relies on using unused header
fields in network protocols like TCP/IP or ICMP. There are several fields in these protocols that
do not have standardized default values, or that are not normally checked by network devices.
For example, several covert channels use the Type of Service (TOS) field or several flag values
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in the TCP header [4], [10]. Both IPv4 and IPv6 have options fields that can be used if needed.
It has been identified that an attacker could use the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop, routing, fragment, au-
thentication and encapsulating security payload extension headers to embed covert information
[4].
In addition to unused fields, commonly used fields can also be used. Two methods modulate the
initial sequence number field of TCP. One takes one covert byte, multiples it by 256, and uses
that for the TCP’s Initial Sequence Number(ISN). Another method encrypts the covert data and
uses that as the ISN. The second method results in uniformly distributed ISNs [4], [11].
Another common field to manipulate is the checksum field. The checksum field of an IP packet
can be encoded with a secret message and an extra header extension can be added to ensure the
IP’s checksum matches the covert channel checksum. In UDP, the checksum is optional. In this
case, an attacker could turn the checksum on or off to encode one bit of a covert message per
packet [4].
A method similar to traditional timing attacks using shared processors is to modulate the time
between sent packets. This works when the sender uses discrete time intervals between each
packet sent. The number and length of discrete time values can vary from two to however
many the receiver can distinguish one value from another. For a two-value system, each packet
sent conveys one bit of the covert message. For multi-rate channels, the system can transmit
log
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r covert bits per packet, where r is the number of discrete timing values. This method does
require some means to establish and maintain time synchronization [4], [12].
2.5 Countermeasures
2.5.1 Identification
Covert channels are meant to be difficult to detect, so detecting and eliminating them can be
challenging. Because of the complex nature of computers and networks, in most cases it is not
even possible to completely eliminate the potential for covert channels or to prove their non-
existence. But, there is a set of methods that can be employed to lessen the potential or degrade
their possible bandwidth [4]. With these methods, the user has to balance the danger of loss
of information due to covert channels against the impact these methods have on performance
and usability. In [4], Zander outlined a two-step process to develop countermeasures, with
6
the first step being to identify the covert channel being used. The second step is to apply
countermeasures, which he grouped into four broad areas as follows:
1. Eliminate the channel
2. Limit the bandwidth of the channel
3. Audit the channel
4. Document the channel
In traditional high-assurance systems, identification takes the form of semi-formal methods.
Some of the methods include information flow analysis, noninterference analysis, SRM method,
and the covert flow tree method [4]. These methods can be used during the design phase of a
system.
Less work has been done on the formal analysis needed to identify and measure the capacity
of covert channels in network protocols. Donaldson suggested that the SRM could be applied
for this purpose by splitting the host-to-host channels from the intra-host channels on a single
computer [4], [13]. Helouet proposed a requirements-level analysis for covert channels on
distributed systems [4].
Countermeasures can be applied once a covert channel has been identified. In some cases, the
channel is available due to a mistake made in building the system and can usually be fixed with a
patch or similar fix. More complex methods need to be applied if the channel is due to systemic
aspects of the system or due to unwillingness to reduce functionality [4].
Zander and others believe that in real-world situations it is impossible to eliminate all covert
channels. Hence, we should eliminate the ones we can and apply the remediation methods to
the ones that remain [4].
2.5.2 Eliminating Channels
The first line of defense is to have secure systems. This could include running hardened kernels,
regularly installing software and firmware updates, and ensuring services are properly config-
ured. This will help mitigate the spread of viruses, Trojan horses, rootkits and other software
that could insert and exploit a covert channel. A secure system should also limit the number of
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services to only the ones that are required. For example, if a web server is not needed, do not
allow it to run. Also, ICMP is not needed by most users and can be disabled [4].
Many of the network headers manipulating covert channels can be eliminated by normalizing
header fields. This can take the form of strictly enforcing protocol specifications or where
they are not well defined, setting the values to zero. Zander gives an example with the Don’t
Fragment (DF) bit. If the DF bit is not set, a normal system probably would not check the IP
Identification number, which would be needed if an IP packet was fragmented. Setting the IP
ID number to zero every time the DF bit was zero would eliminate use of the IP ID number
as a covert channel [4]. Secure systems should also apply this technique to optional header
fields that should be all zeros if not in use. Handley outlines a broad collection of methods to
normalize network header fields [14]. These methods add some extra overhead, which would
have to be balanced with existing requirements.
2.5.3 Limiting Capacity
Information about a channel’s bandwidth is useful for applying remediation methods. With
some channels, it is easy to determine the bits-per-packet capacity. For example, if a covert
channel is modulating a single bit, the per-packet capacity is one bit. The bits-per-second rate
is harder to determine, since it is dependent on the overt traffic on which the covert channel
depends.
If a channel is sensitive to noise, such as timing channels, a server could intermittently send
dummy packets to other systems to try and add some noise to the channel [4].
Packet-length-based covert channels can be limited by reducing the possible lengths a packet
could have thereby limiting the number of states a packet-length covert channel could use. If
a packet is too small, the packet could be padded with extra zeros. The disadvantage to this
approach is the wasted bandwidth. If bandwidth were not a concern, a user could completely
remove this type of channel by allowing only one possible packet length on the network [15].
Limiting timing channels by varying the time between packets can limit the capacity of a chan-
nel. For example, one high-assurance system uses a store-and-forward router to transfer infor-
mation from low to high. In this system, the low sends data to the high while the high sends
acknowledgments to the low. To prevent the high system from using the acknowledgments as a
timing covert channel, the router could store the acknowledgments and only transmit them after
a small random amount of time. This does not completely eliminate this timing channel, but it
does reduce its bandwidth [4], [15].
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2.5.4 Detection Methods
In real-world situations, it is going to be too expensive or technically impractical to secure every
system on a network. As a result, methods have been developed to test for covert channels. Most
of these methods rely on the fact that the behavior of the covert channel differs measurably from
normal traffic. An example is the header-based channels like initial IP ID and TCP ISN covert
channels that result in random values. Normal IP ID and TCP ISN numbers actually follow a
fairly predictable distribution, with the actual pattern tied to the operating system. It is possible
to detect changes from the anticipated patterns with a high degree of certainty. The probability
of detection drops significantly once the covert channel has a distribution close to that of normal
traffic [4], [16].
A similar method can be used for timing based covert channels. Venkatramn proposed measur-
ing the average time between packets for a given network. If the rate increased or decreased for
a host by a certain trigger amount, this would indicate a covert channel [17]. This method can
produce an increasing rate of false alarms and missed detections the further the normal traffic
deviates from the average.
2.6 Packet Length-Based Covert Channels
From this point forward in the thesis, we treat only packet length covert channels. There have
been several reported research investigations into packet length-based covert channels. Two
papers highlighted in this section, Liping [5] and Nair [18], look at covert channels over a UDP
packet network. The papers are narrow in scope and do not address detection of covert channels
from a network-wide perspective.
2.6.1 Implementation of Packet Length-Based Covert Channels
This subsection provides an overview of Liping’s paper, entitled “A Novel Covert Channel
Based on Length of Messages” [5].
This paper builds on earlier work by attempting to make a packet length covert channel have
a distribution of packet lengths similar to normal traffic. The authors claim that their approach
is protocol-independent and flexible enough to markedly lower the probability of detection.
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Their method uses samples of network traffic to build what they call a reference. This reference
is used to determine what length to use and adjusts future packet lengths to ensure a normal
distribution. The steps of transmission are as follows:
1. Sender and receiver communicate normally. Both record the packet lengths sent and
record the numbers in the reference.
2. Sender and receiver select a length l from the reference using the same agreed upon
algorithm.
3. Using an agreed-upon packet number, the sender sends a message of length l plus a num-
ber based on the contents of the packet. The reference is then updated with the new
length.
4. Receiver determines the message by subtracting the number based on the contents of the
packet from the packet length.
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated until the entire message is sent.
The paper then outlines their experimental results and how they compare to other covert channel
schemes that have random distributions. From their results, it appears that their method matches
a normal distribution more closely than the other methods.
The Liping paper does not provide any detail on how the reference is constructed from normal
traffic nor does it detail how it is supposed to allow the covert channel to mimic normal traffic.
This would make it difficult to replicate the results or to rely on the findings of the study. While
the research shows promise at normalizing covert channel traffic, the paper lacked enough sup-
porting information to make a convincing case that their method avoids detection by mimicking
normal traffic.
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2.6.2 Possible Method to Detect Packet Length Covert Channel
This subsection gives an overview of Nair’s paper, entitled “Detection of Packet Length Based
Network Steganograpy” [18].
Nair investigated how to detect the covert channel introduced by Liping. The author developed
a mathematical detection mechanism. The claim is that the mechanism can detect Liping’s
channel in addition to detecting their varient of Liping’s covert channel.
The author developed a testbed centered around a UDP protocol chat program implemented in
Java. Nair then ran the program using chat data to determine what the normal distribution looks
like. For their detection method, Nair introduced a function they call a packet-length vector.
It is a first-order statistic using the number of packets for each of the valid packet lengths
representing the relative frequency of a particular packet length in the series of packets.
Nair then used a technique that has been applied in steganography of images to compare the
normal packet length vector to a covert channel vector. Nair found that changes in packet
lengths will result in changes in the packet length vector that make the graphed vector less
smooth. This change can be quantified by first performing a discrete Fourier transfom (DFT) on






Here X is the packet length vector, while Xdft is the DFT performed on X . The summation
adds each element in the DFT vector. Nair observed that COM(Covert) is usually greater than
COM(Normal), where covert is the covert channel DFT and Normal is the normal traffic DFT.
Nair’s implementation of Liping’s covert channel is susceptible to detection simply by analyz-
ing the graph of packet length relative to time. Nair modified Liping’s algorithm to be less
susceptible to detection, but did not specify what was changed.
Nair’s results are promising, providing for detecting covert channels especially their application
of DFT’s to network-based covert channels. However, Nair’s data was limited to a simple
standalone UDP-based chat program. It is unknown whether Nair’s method could detect other
types of packet length-based channels on other protocols or services and whether that traffic
could be detected when mixed with other traffic.
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This chapter describes a packet length-based covert channel. We will refer back to this type
of channel later in the thesis. The channel might be part of a rootkit covert-communications
capability. Once installed, the channel could be used to communicate between two hosts, but
only if a sufficient level of overt traffic is going between the two systems to minimize the
probability of detection of the channel’s transmissions.
3.1 Channel Structure
The covert channel relies on assigning a series of symbols or values to separate packet lengths,
which we call the reference. The reference is shared by the sender and receiver by some channel
separate from the covert channel. This could be distributed by any number of means, which
might include hard-coded in the rootkit, embedded in an image on a well-known website, or
embedded in an e-mail. The channel can use as many or as few packet lengths as desired,
depending on the needs of the participants. If viewed in terms of information theory, the packet
lengths are the symbols of the channel and, as long as the symbol transmission remains constant,
one can increase the bandwidth of the channel by increasing the number of packet lengths used
[19].
Figure 3.1: Covert Channel Structure
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In our case, we assign a packet length to each character in the ASCII table. We use consecutive
packet lengths between 400 and 527, but this is an arbitrary range since the channel can be in
non-consecutive packet lengths of any length spread across the possible packet lengths of the
overt channel. Figure 3.1 shows the possible packet lengths of an Ethernet 1500 bit frame.
To simplify implementation, we assume that any packets arriving from a known covert channel
peer that have a packet length between 400 and 527 are a part of the covert channel. If no covert
channel traffic is to be sent, no packets would have a length within that range. Lastly, the user
manually sets the address of the remote user they wish to communicate with. This could also
be hard-coded for ease of use.
3.2 Implementation
We decided to implement the channel in Linux (kernel 2.6.31) since the system is open source
and allows for easy modifications. One assumption is that the overt users have no idea that their
traffic is being modified for use in a covert channel. To accomplish this, the easiest way is to
modify the kernel itself instead of relying on modifying applications like the browser Firefox.
In order to do this, we modified the network stack of the kernel. This allowed us access to
any traffic being sent out, regardless of what application was generating it. We modified the
kernel’s network stack code directly. This could also be accomplished in a kernel module that
can be separately installed. This would allow a kernel module rootkit to easily modify a running
unmodified kernel.
The overall structure of the channel is a modified TCP stack inside the kernel. The modified
code maintains send and receive buffers inside kernel-space. All users interact with the channel
via new system calls. This allows a program to be written in user-space to use the channel
without having to modify the kernel.
Linux’s network stack is highly modularized with separate function definitions for each pro-
tocol. We chose to implement the channel with TCP, so we concentrated on those functions.
We modified tcp.c, tcp output.c, and tcp input.c found in the net/ipv4 directory. The kernel
source code location depends on the distribution, but usually can be found in the /usr/src/linux
directory. See Appendix A for a complete listing of the source code.
In tcp.c, we set up the infrastructure to allow a user to communicate using the covert channel.
New send and receive buffers were set up inside the kernel along with buffer index variables.
New variables were also set up to save the IP address of the covert channel peer. In the case
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where there are multiple TCP connections between two peers, the covert channel only uses one
of those connections. This simplification removes the problem of having the covert channel
reassemble the covert message spread across multiple connections. This is enforced within the
kernel using a Boolean int variable (is cov channel) added to struct sock common found in
sock.h and another Boolean int variable in the kernel (cov channel locked).
To change the packet length, the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) is modulated. This forces the
rest of the kernel code to shorten the packet to the desired packet length, creating the desired
effect of modulating the packet length. The MSS value is set to the maximum size a packet
can be without getting fragmented. This value rarely changes, and is normally 1460 for regular
Ethernet. See Appendix A.3, starting at line 61, or the discussion below for details.
Three new system calls were added to allow processes to use the covert channel within user-
space. One system call allows a user to add a message to the send buffer, one allows a user to
read from the receive buffer, and another allows a user to set which peer to communicate with.
Lastly, four non-system call helper functions were added for use within the kernel. If the user
does not require user-space functionality, these functions can be removed with the result that all
interaction with the channel is restricted to kernel-space.
3.2.1 Transmitting
After a TCP connection is established in Linux, the tcp write xmit function in tcp output.c is
called every time data is sent. For the covert channel, it first must test if the channel is being used
by any other connection (Listing 3.1). The connection executing tcp write xmit will be used
and locked for the covert channel if the channel is not already locked by another connection
(!cov channel locked) and the destination address for the connection is equal to the covert
channel peer address (inet− > daddr == cov channel address).
Listing 3.1: Locking a TCP connection within tcp output.c
i f ( ! sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l && ! c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d
&& i n e t −>daddr == c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s ) {
c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d =1;
sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l =1;
}
Once the channel is locked, the user can use the connection to send data over the covert channel.
Next, the connection checks if there are any covert messages to be sent (sk− > is cov channel
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&& packet! = −1), as well as if there are any overt messages of sufficient length (skb− >
len (400+packet)). If those two conditions are true, the packet will be processed for the covert
message (Listing 3.2). The connection reads one character from the send buffer and adds its
integer value to 400. For example, assume the character read from the buffer was “d.” The
ASCII value for “d” is 100, so the MSS value would be 400 + 100 = 500. If the overt message
has a length that falls inside the covert channel, then the kernel will reduce the MSS to 399,
which is right below the covert channel. For other cases, the MSS value will be set using its
normal size.
Listing 3.2: Decision Point within tcp output.c
p a c k e t = c h a n n e l p a c k e t c h e c k ( ) ;
i n t p a c k e t u s e d =0;
i f ( sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l && p a c k e t !=−1 && skb−>l e n > (400+ p a c k e t ) ) {
p a c k e t u s e d =1;
p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” p a c k a g e t o s e n d −%c −%d ” , packe t , p a c k e t ) ;
mss now = 400 + p a c k e t ;
}
e l s e i f ( skb−>l e n >= 400 && skb−>l e n <=527)
mss now =399;
e l s e
mss now= r e a l m s s ;
If the message was successfully sent, the connection will remove the packet from the covert
buffer by calling channel get package to send(). See Listing 3.3.
Listing 3.3: Transmitting in tcp output.c
i f ( p a c k e t u s e d )
p a c k e t = c h a n n e l g e t p a c k a g e t o s e n d ( ) ;
i f ( u n l i k e l y ( t c p t r a n s m i t s k b ( sk , skb , 1 , g fp ) ) )
break ;
The covert channel code adds some additional overhead as compared to unmodified Linux, but
it should be a small impact. It does add a handful of conditional statements into every packet
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being sent, and another handful of array operations if a covert channel message is being sent.
Given that unmodified Linux has many more conditional statements associated with each packet
sent, this should be a small addition. This thesis leaves performance and quality of service issues
to future research.
3.2.2 Receiving
Receiving requires much less redesign to implement. The only modification was made to
tcp event data recv function found in tcp input.c, which is called every time an TCP packet
is received. The function begins by first checking whether the TCP packet originated from the
address of a covert channel peer and also if the packet length is in range of the covert chan-
nel. See Listing 3.4. If those cases are true, the connection subtracts 400 from the packet
length to derive the original covert packet. It then adds it to the receive buffer by calling chan-
nel put package received().
Listing 3.4: Receiving tcp input.c
i f ( i n e t s k ( sk)−>daddr == c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s
&& skb−>l e n >= 400 && skb−>l e n <=527)
c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e c e i v e d ( skb−>l en −400);
3.2.3 Code Demonstration
The user interacts with the covert channel using three new system calls. These calls maintain
the send and receive buffers, which are simply statically defined integer arrays of size 1000.
The send buffer is a circular buffer, while the receive buffer is a first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer.
We wrote a C program that used the system calls to demonstrate the channel (Appendix A.4).
The program has three wrapper functions that directly use the system calls by putting strings
into the send buffer and by reading from the receive buffer.
The testing was conducted on a local area network with Internet access that had a web server
on one computer and the example program on a client machine. The website was a series
of pictures hosted on an Apache server running Linux. The kernels on both machines were
modified with the covert channel. The test program was run on the website server and inserted
the text “Hidden in plain sight” onto the send buffer. A user on the other machine downloaded a
picture from the website and then ran the test program to read from the buffer. Figure 3.2 shows
the image that was downloaded and the print output of the test program showing the covert
channel message.
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Later testing had the user view multiple websites on other machines before and after down-
loading an image from the covert channel website. During the testing, a network dump was
conducted using wireshark. Figure 3.3 gives a visual snapshot of packet lengths from 300 to
1425 from the network dump. The horizontal axis is the packet number, which roughly cor-
responds with time while the vertical axis is packet length. The covert channel can easily be
spotted as the compact groupings of packets between 400 and 600 packet lengths in the bot-
tom left of the image. Most of the remaining packets are legitimate traffic such as HTTP page
requests.
Figure 3.2: Example Screenshot of Program Execution
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Figure 3.3: Sample Network Traffic Displaying Packet Number and Packet Length
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CHAPTER 4:
Statistical Approach to Detection and Bandwidth
Analysis
Both references [5] and [18] treat the detection of a packet-based covert channel in the context
of a single connection. In this thesis, we are interested in how an IDS can be used to detect a
packet length-based covert channel and what bandwidth that channel could attain while escap-
ing detection. The IDS would be used to monitor an intranet or on a network gateway. This
chapter outlines the framework that can be used to estimate the bandwidth of the channel, as
well as a system that can be used by the IDS.
4.1 Maximum Bandwidth
Covert channels always require overt information to transmit data, so the bandwidth of the
covert channel will be tied to the bandwidth of the overt channel. In the case of the covert
channel from Chapter 3, the covert packet is dependent on the size of the overt channel packet.
This packet size or segment size is normally 1460 bytes for Ethernet. So, for every segment
size section of overt channel bandwidth, the covert channel can encode some information. The
amount of information depends on how many packet-lengths or channels are being used for the
covert channel.
Converting the number of packet-lengths into bits can be done by taking the log base 2 of the
number of packet-lengths in the covert channel or log2(channels). Therefore, each packet of
the overt channel can encode log2(channels) of covert channel bits. The maximum bandwidth








If a user used the maximum covert bandwidth, this should greatly alter the distribution of packet-
lengths for the network. On the other hand, if there is a lot of traffic on the network and the user
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only sends a small amount of covert data, the change in the packet-length distribution would
go undetected. Between these extremes is a threshold at which the covert channel becomes
detectable.
Detection of the channel will depend on the characteristics of the overt channel. The distri-
bution of packet lengths on a normal network has some predictable characteristics. There is
a significant amount of traffic from 52 to 300 bytes, with much of this being TCP acknowl-
edgment packets. There is also a large amount of traffic between 1300 and 1500 bytes. This
is where much of the data is being transmitted. In between 300 and 1300 is much less data,
but activity remains, with much of the HTTP page requests occurring here. The frequency and
number of packet-lengths of the network will fluctuate, depending on many factors, such as the
network applications being used, time of day, and day of week. Figure 4.1 shows a graph of
a network’s packet lengths over the course of a day. The hour scale goes from 0 to 24 hours,
while the packet length goes from 50 to 1500. The Frequency axis depicts the number of times
a given packet length occurred during each hour. The method for collecting this data is outlined
in Chapter 5.
Figure 4.1: Single Day Graph of Packet Lengths from the School Network
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We can construct a function T (l) that will be called the threshold function. The function returns
the minimum number of packets that can be sent with packet-length l that will be considered
abnormal. Here we use statistical analysis for this function. Another approach could use DFTs.
In order for a covert channel to escape detection, it will have to transmit below the threshold set
in T (l). This will depend on the size of the covert message being sent and the frequency of the
bytes (symbols) associated with length l. Let M be the covert message being sent in a given
time frame and let qi be the probability of symbol i appearing in M . Then, avoiding detection
can be represented as:
Mqi < T (li) (4.2)
Several observations can be seen right away. For the channel to remain undetected, the trans-
mitted data must remain in the noise by doing one of three things:
• Reduce the signal by reducing the size of M
• Spread the signal out by reducing the probability qi. If the channel is encrypted, creating
an evenly distributed cipher stream, qi simply becomes 1channels . In this case, increasing
the number of channels will decrease the probability.
• Pick a packet length with a greater threshold.
Summing all the thresholds for each packet length in the covert channel and subtracting normal
traffic (Ni) should result in the total symbols of the channel. To convert it to bits, one can





4.3 Defining the Threshold Function
The threshold function can use any method that can distinguish the covert channel traffic from
normal traffic. The goal is a function that extracts the covert channel signal from the noise
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of regular traffic. We will use statistical inference to compare new traffic with an historical
average. The average data will be broken down by packet length and a user-defined unit of time
such as hour of the day.
The function is:
T (l) = Csl + Al (4.4)
where l is the packet length of interest and sl is the standard deviation of occurrences for l. Al
represents the average occurrences of l. C is a constant and can be used to adjust the number of
standard of deviations one wishes to use.
4.4 Intrusion Detection Framework
In addition to using this framework to estimate the bandwidth of the covert channel, one can
also use it to build a framework for intrusion detection. One can define a function that tracks
the number of packet lengths that exceed the threshold function and then flag the traffic if it









E(i) >= alert (4.6)
Here, E(l) returns 1 if the sampled frequency (fl) for packet length l exceeded the threshold
funciton, T (l). A 1 represents a single alert. All other cases will return 0. The next equation
states an intrusion has occurred if the sum of all alerts over the span of possible packet lengths
has exceeded the user-defined cutoff alert.
This system will allow for estimating a covert channel’s bandwidth, as well as for a system to
detect these channels. Much of this follows signals theory and the cat and mouse game between




To test the system of equations outlined in Chapter 4, we devised a testbed that includes data
obtained by sampling network traffic and injecting test traffic. Our network of choice was live
traffic from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Glasgow Hall, home of the NPS Computer Science
Department.
5.1 Network Architecture
The school network is partitioned into several subnets. The Computer Science Department is
part of the Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences, which resides in Glasgow
Hall East Wing. We conducted all our collection using a collector that sniffed traffic near the
gateway to the Internet. See Figure 5.1 for a network diagram. We restricted all analysis to
traffic coming and going from Glasgow Hall to the Internet and saved just the time the packet
was received and the packet length.
Figure 5.1: Network Diagram
5.2 Collection
The equations found in Chapter 4 require a baseline dataset to compare live traffic. One could
use a dataset from an outside source, or the better option would be to sample one’s own network.
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To sample traffic on the school’s network required several steps to get the collected data into a
form we could analyze. The steps are shown in Figure 5.2.
1. Save network data in a standard form, conduct data reduction, and transfer to the comput-
ing platform upon which analysis will be conducted
2. Import data reduced files into database
3. Summarize raw data into units of time to be used for analysis (rawdata to count)
4. Conduct steps 1–3 until desired level of sampling has been attained
5. Calculate average and standard deviation on data set (count to ave)
Figure 5.2: Transfer Process
Step 1 began by having the collector save the data in a standard way. The collector we used was
a regular part of the network, and it saved all the packets that traversed the school network to
the Internet. Entire packets in pcap format were saved in 650-megabyte files. Pcap format is a
standard format for saving raw network packet information, and it is used by programs such as
tcpdump and Wireshark [21].
Given the large amount of data generated by the collector, the files had to be reduced before
sending them to the analyzer. The code outlined in Appendix B.1 was used to read the pcap
files, strip off the Unix timestamp and the IP packet length, and save them to a separate file.
To minimize the file sizes, only IP packets of sizes between 56 and 1499 were saved. The
program also checked each packet to ensure it was part of the Glasgow Hall subnet. It did this
by conducting a bit-wise “and” between the destination and source addresses and comparing it
with the netmask of Glasgow Hall. Using a bit-wise “and” simply ands the bits of the address,
26
which is a fast and simple operation. If either source or destination addresses matched the
netmask, the packet information was saved. Another method used for step 1 was a custom
program that read network traffic directly using the libpcap library and only wrote the UNIX
timestamp and packet length to a separate file. The code for this program can be found in
Appendix B.2.
Once each pcap file was reduced to the timestamp and packet length, the files were compressed
and transfered to the computer upon which the data was analyzed. The files were then inserted
into a MySQL database (MySQL v5.1.52 on Linux) using a bash script (Appendix B.3). The
database was broken into three tables: rawdata, count, and ave. See Appendix C for the full
SQL table definitions. Rawdata simply saves all the data from each of the filtered pcap files
into the database. Table count sums the packet lengths from rawdata for a unit of time that
corresponds with the units used for the equations found in Chapter 4. The SQL code to compute
count is as follows:
Listing 5.1: Populating Table count using Table rawdata
i n s e r t i n t o count s e l e c t ( timestamp>>10)<<10 as time , l en , 1
from r a w d a t a on d u p l i c a t e key update c o u n t e r = c o u n t e r +1
This command first takes everything from the table rawtable using the select command. It then
strips off the first 10 bits of the timestamp using bit-wise shift command to convert the time
to 17-minute intervals. Unix timestamps are measured in seconds, with 10 bits approximately
equaling 17 minutes. One can use another value instead of 10 to increase or decrease the unit of
time, or one could use a modulo command to use a base other than 2. The bit-wise method was
used since it performs faster than the modulo command. Lastly, the analyzer uses the duplicate
key update command to sum the traffic.
Hourly averages are also computed, since there is a large variation in traffic based from hour to
hour. For example, using the time interval of 17 minutes, a 17-minute average is computed for
each hour of the day. The table ave is used to store the averages, which stores the hour, packet
length, average, and standard deviation. The full definition can be found in Appendix C. To
compute it, the following code was run:
Listing 5.2: Populating Table ave using Table count
i n s e r t i n t o ave s e l e c t l en , avg ( c o u n t e r ) , s t d d e v p o p ( c o u n t e r ) ,
hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) from t o t c o u n t
group by l en , hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) )
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5.3 Injection and Analysis Framework
Once the baseline dataset is obtained, one can begin sampling and analyzing the data. The anal-
ysis was done by comparing new collection against the table average established previously.
We conducted the analysis on an entire day’s worth of sampled data, since it was easier on the
collector to forward data on a daily basis. Further work could be done to increase the frequency
with which analyses are run. This would speed up detection of a potential covert channel.
5.3.1 Analysis
The steps for analysis followed the same steps 1 through 3 of collection. We created a table for
each of the analysis days with the same table properties as count and rawdata. We did this to
maintain all the data collected, but one does not need to do this. One could simply reuse the
tables rawdata and count and simply delete the old data.
The following SQL command is used to compare the new data with the average using the
equations from Chapter 4:
Listing 5.3: Comparing new data with baseline
s e l e c t timestamp , hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) ,
count ( c . l e n ) from count as c , ave
where hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) = hour and
c . l e n =ave . l e n and c . c o u n t e r > ( s t d e v ∗6+ ave )
group by timestamp
order by hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) ;
First, the command computes which packet lengths within a single timestamp block (17-minute
block) have exceeded stdev ∗ 6 + ave (Equation 4.4). In this example, we use 6 standard
deviations. Next, the command counts the number of packet lengths that have exceeded the
threshold for a given timestamp as outlined in Equations 4.5 and 4.6. This is done by using the
count SQL operation in conjunction with the group by timestamp.
Another analysis tool graphs the traffic visually. This can be done using a SQL output like this:
Listing 5.4: Outputting count table for display in gnuplot
s e l e c t hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) , l en ,
sum ( c o u n t e r ) from c o u n t j a n 0 6 group by hour (
f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) , l e n
order by hour ( f r o m u n i x t i m e ( timestamp ) ) , l e n
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The output of this can then be displayed using a three-dimensional rendering program such
as gnuplot [22]. This will create images similar to Figure 4.1. This form of analysis made it
visually possible to determine if there was unusual traffic over the course of the day. Often,
it could be determined quickly, using this method, that automated applications were running
during the night because they generated large spikes throughout the night.
5.3.2 Injection
For the injection, it was decided to use arbitrary packet injection instead of using the actual
covert channel code outlined in Chapter 3. This provided increased flexibility in choosing the
packet length and frequency of injection. Injection was provided using a program called hping
[23]. This program extends the capabilities of the basic ping program to include the creation on
arbitrary packets of variable size using several networking protocols such as IP, UDP, and TCP.
For the experiments, we used a machine within the Glasgow subnet to send packets of specific
lengths to arbitrary sites on the Internet.
Testing followed these steps:
1. Inject a packet with specific length as many times as desired and log transmission.
2. Repeat step 1 with different packet lengths until desired.
3. Wait until unit of time as defined in Section 4.3 has elapsed. In this case, this was 17
minutes.
4. Repeat 1–3 until testing complete.
5. Process and analyze collected data.
Steps 1 and 2 were done in parallel using bash scripting.
The system of collection, analysis, and injection outlined in this chapter allowed for accurate
testing of the equations and framework outlined in Chapter 4.
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Several questions have been proposed on whether it is possible to detect packet length covert
channels from a network wide perspective. To test this, three weeks worth of collection was
performed on the school network, to include over a week of baseline collection. The baseline
data provided the information to calculate the threshold functions in Chapter 3.
6.1 Summary of Baseline Data
The baseline data consisted of over 400 million packets collected over the course of several
weeks during the work week (i.e., Monday-Friday).
The school’s network traffic was found to be variable depending on time of day and day of the
week. Figure 6.1 shows the daily packet totals for each day. Saturday and Sunday are also
shown for reference. Figure 6.2 shows a graph of hourly traffic averages. The large spike in the
late morning corresponded to when most of the computer science classes are taught.
Figure 6.1: Daily Packet Totals
31
Figure 6.2: Hourly Packet Profile
It was also noticed that several applications ran over the course of days or ran during off-hour
times. This had the effect of creating noticeable traffic during the middle of the night. This
adversely affected detection by creating false positives if the baseline data had not seen the
application run.
6.2 Detecting Packet Length Covert Channels: Narrow Scope
Before we could detect a covert channel, we needed to determine a good multiple for the stan-
dard deviation for Equation 4.4. We concentrated on packet lengths between 1181 and 1190.
This area had low variability and low enough packet counts to make testing easier. Using the
baseline data, it was determined that a multiple of 6 removed all false positives from normal
traffic. Table 6.1 shows the false positives for each multiple. The predicted number of pack-
ets at which the covert channel would become visible fell between 200 and 410, depending on
the hour and packet length. This was calculated using Equation 4.4, the multiple of 6 and the
baseline standard deviations for the packet lengths during regular working hours. All injections
were conducted during regular working hours.
With the number of packets set, the test consisted of using the steps outlined in Chapter 5 to
inject 300 to 1000 packets on each packet length between 1181 and 1190. This was considered
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an injection set with one injection set conducted every 18 minutes. This allowed for only one
injection set for each 17-minute unit of time set in Chapter 5. In total, 19 injection sets were
conducted with the results shown in Table 6.2. The high number of false negatives was due
to trying to send packets at rates for the 6 standard deviation multiple. Several times the overt
traffic would be lower than normal and the channel would not be detected. It was also observed
that the collector would drop between 0 to 0.75 percent of packets. These factors made it
difficult to inject exactly 6 standard deviations worth of data and required about 30 additional
injection sets worth of testing before testable inject values were found. If the inject rate was
raised above the 6 standard deviation multiple, all the injected traffic was detected (Table 6.3).
Using Equation 4.4, Table 6.4 shows the predicted bandwidth for a 10 packet length channel
between 1181 and 1190 and the actual bandwidth from the testing. The data used the higher
data-rate injects used in Table 6.3.








Table 6.2: Detection of Covert Channel
Channels Injected Channel Detections False Positives False Negatives
110 59 9 29
Table 6.3: Detection of Covert Channel with Higher Inject Rates
Channels Injected Channel Detections False Positives False Negatives
80 80 4 0
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6.3 Detecting Packet Length Covert Channels: Network-Wide
Problems arose once we scaled the narrow testing to all packet lengths. Many of the packet
lengths proved extremely volatile making it difficult to compute the standard deviation multiple.
When we say volatile here, we refer to packets that have large packet length standard deviation.
Some packet lengths required very large multiples in order to remove false positives while
others only required small multiples. To fix this, we used different standard deviation multiples
depending on the packet length, average packet count and the standard deviation for a given
packet. This had the effect of allowing for more variability in volatile packet length regions
while maintaining narrow variability in regions with little volatility. Appendix C.2 outlines
specific SQL commands used. The multiples varied from 5 to 50 with the most volatile packet
lengths getting larger multiples.
Using Equation 4.4, we were able to calculate the maximum undetectable bandwidth for all the
packet lengths throughout the day. Figure 6.3 shows the possible channel bandwidths in bits
per second for a 20 packet length covert channel.
Even with the variable standard deviation multiples, some false positives remained. However,
these false positives rarely exceeded 10 to 20 packet lengths for a 17-minute time interval.
Therefore, a value between 10 and 20 was found to be a good number for the alerts variable in
Equation 4.6. This would mean a covert channel would need to exceed the threshold function for
10-20 packet lengths in order for it to be flagged as abnormal using our measurement techniques.
Experiments were then conducted by injecting a 20-packet length covert channel using the same
methods outlined in the narrow scope section (Section 6.2), but with the standard deviation
multiples found in Appendix C.2. Table 6.5 shows the detection statistics for these tests, the
actual versus predicted bandwidths.
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Figure 6.3: Channel Bandwidth for a 20-Packet Length Covert Channel
Table 6.5: Detection of Covert Channel-Network Wide
Channels Injected Channel Detections False Positives/Time Unit False Negatives
160 93 5 67
Table 6.6: Detection of Covert Channel with Higher Inject Rates-Network Wide
Channels Injected Channel Detections False Positives/Time Unit False Negatives
120 118 4 2





Figure 6.4: Hourly Bandwidth for a 20-Channel Covert Channel
With these numbers, one can now predict possible bandwidths for an undetectable packet based
covert channel on this network. Figure 6.4 shows the hourly maximum predicted undetectable
bandwidth of a 20 packet length covert channel. This assumes the channel uses the highest
bandwidth channels based on Equation 4.4 and the baseline data. It also assumes the messages
being sent are evenly distributed, which would cause the user to use the least variable packet
length transfer rate for the rest of the packet lengths. Otherwise, the channel would transmit at
rates higher than the least variable packet length and would cause detection. The figures would
be even higher if the user had a message distribution that perfectly matched the distribution
of the traffic. Under these assumptions, some packet lengths such as lengths between 50 and
70 used for TCP acks or packets over 1400 bits, had as high as several kilobits per second
bandwidth.
As indicated by Figure 6.4, the channel’s peak bandwidth happened during the middle of the
day, with a bandwidth of around 13,000 bits per second. This does not seem to be a lot, espe-
cially when compared to the large amount of legitimate data that is getting transmitted. But, if
one assumes the channel continuously transmits data at rates consistent with Figure 6.4 for an
entire day, a total of nearly 600 Mb of data will be transmitted. This is a significant amount of
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data. Even if one assumes the threshold function could be made more exact, with a resulting
reduction in the bandwidth of the channel, its bandwidth would probably still be in the hundreds
of megabits per day.
Figure 6.5 shows the bandwidth in megabits per day for channels using between 2 to 1400
packet lengths. This assumes an even distribution for any covert message being sent, which
would cause the use of the least variable packet length transfer rate as discussed before. One
can immediately see the bandwidth peaks at 800 Mb before gradually dropping down as the
number of packet lengths increase. This can be explained by analyzing the variability of the
packet lengths. There are only about 100 packet lengths that have a high degree of variability,
but after that there is a marked decrease into the lesser-used packet lengths. As the channel
becomes wider and wider, it must transmit at slower and slower rates in order to avoid detection
on the lesser-used lengths.
If a user had a covert message with the exact distribution of the network or had a method to
map the message to the distribution of the network, one could then take advantage of the high
variability of the often-used lengths. The bandwidth of this scheme can been seen in Figure 6.6.
Here, the bandwidth continues to increase, but the increase slows as the channel uses more and
more of the lesser used packet lengths.
These figures illustrate how much data could be exfiltrated without being detected. While these
numbers may be high due to the simple threshold function being used, the figure may still be in
the several hundred magabits of data per day.
37
Figure 6.5: Bandwidth vs. Used Packet Lengths with Even Distribution
Figure 6.6: Bandwidth vs. Used Packet Lengths
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CHAPTER 7:
Conclusion and Further Work
This thesis has shown that it is possible to detect packet length covert channels while monitoring
large-scale networks. It has also shown how variable network traffic can be and how it affects
the detectability of covert channels. In this thesis, we also demonstrated that it is possible to
accurately predict the bandwidth of packet length covert channels and showed that, even at low
bandwidths, a covert channel could transmit large amounts of data over the course of a day. The
following section outlines some further work that could improve the detectability and robustness
of the covert channel.
7.1 Further Work
7.1.1 Better Threshold Function
The threshold function used here relies on basic statistical analysis. Another function that uses
more sophisticated mathematical tools could possibly better identify what is considered normal
traffic and separate it from unusual traffic. Initial research for this thesis focused on using a
DFT calculated for each packet over the course of time. The function proved to be promising,
but was only able to detect channels that used packet lengths grouped together or ones that
transmitted large amounts of data using a small number of packet lengths. A possible area of
research would be to continue investigating the use of DFTs in a threshold function. One idea
would be to use the function outlined in reference [18] on a network level instead of simply on
a per-connection basis.
The unit of time for the threshold function could also be adjusted. We used 17 minutes due to its
speed and efficiency of using bit-wise operations. It would be interesting to test the effectiveness
of shortening the time interval or lengthening it. Also, the location of the collector could be
adjusted. We placed it fairly high in the network and collected data on an entire department.
Further research could test the effectiveness of moving the collection down in the network, even
down to a single computer.
7.1.2 Covert Channel Refinement
The channel we defined offers a basic covert channel. We did not need a more robust channel
for testing purposes, but several steps can be done if this is needed. First, a better reference can
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be used. For example, instead of grouping the channel in a single band as in our channel, one
could distribute it across the range of packet lengths. One could also use the methods already
discussed in [18].
The channel can also be made more robust by expanding the channel into multiple connections
to the same peer. This would likely increase the bandwidth of the channel, but would require
adding packet tracking and reassembly at the covert channel level.
Interaction between kernel and user-space could also be improved with more robust function
calls. Right now, a simple array of buffers is passed between the two. This could be modified to
include reading single characters or only part of the receive buffers. Also, a completely kernel-
space channel could be developed. Lastly, a fully user-space channel is possible. A user could
modify a popular application like Firefox and manually fragment data to desired sizes before
passing them down the TCP stack of an unmodified kernel. Further research could be done in
this area.
The kernel code could also be better implemented. Currently, the code sometimes introduces
artifact packets because of changing the MSS value. They are small packets of less than 400
bytes created from left-over packet data used for the covert channel. Having these artifacts
could potentially increase detection by creating possible patterns between packet lengths, or by
increasing the occurrence of certain packet lengths. This could be fixed by adding functionality
that would remove the small packets and add their data back into the connection’s send buffer.
The covert channel code could be implemented in a kernel module. Currently, the channel is
hard-coded into the kernel, resulting in an immobile system. An improvement would be to
create a kernel module that encompasses the covert channel. This kernel module could then be
tied into an existing rootkit.
Lastly, one could try and implement the channel on non-TCP protocols, like UDP. TCP was
easy to modify in the kernel and, due to TCP’s stateful nature, we did not have to worry about
the ordering of the packets as they arrive. UDP may be easier to modify in the kernel, but one
would have to build some mechanism into the cover channel to account for packets arriving out
of order. This is necessary, since UDP does not track ordering of packets. It also may be worth
researching the use of this channel at the IP level. This would be difficult, since the channel
would have to be mindful of the protocols higher in the network stack. The channel would have
to modify the size of the packet within the TCP or UDP header in addition to crafting a custom
40
IP packet size. Alternatively, the channel could use IP fragmentation to break up the IP packet
without needing to adjust higher level protocols. IP fragmentation allows a sender to break up
a message that is too big for the network it wants to send on. This method would probably be
easily detectable, however, since IP fragmentation is probably not very common.
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2 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x s t a r t =0 ;
3 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x s t a r t ) ;
4 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n =0;
5 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ) ;
6
7 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t =0 ;
8 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t ) ;
9 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d =0;
10 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d ) ;
11
12 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l r e c e i v e b u f [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
13 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l r e c e i v e b u f ) ;
14 s t a t i c i n t c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
15 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f ) ;
16 s t a t i c i n t c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s =0;
17
18 i n t c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d =0;
19 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d ) ;
20
21 u i n t 3 2 t c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s = h t o n l (INADDR LOOPBACK) ;
22 EXPORT SYMBOL( c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s ) ;
23
24 a s m l i n k a g e long s y s c o v c h a n n e l r e a d ( char ∗ b u f f e r , i n t ∗ l e n )
25 {
26 p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” s y s c o v c h a n n e l r e a d l e n g t h −%d ” ,
c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ) ;
27
28 i f ( c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ==0)
29 re turn −1;
30
31 long e r r =0 ;
32
33 long t e m p b u f f [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
45
34 i n t x =0;
35 f o r ( x =0; x<c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ; x ++)
36 {
37 t e m p b u f f [ x ]= c o v c h a n n e l r e c e i v e b u f [ x ] ;
38 c o v c h a n n e l r e c e i v e b u f [ x ]= ’ \0 ’ ;
39 }
40
41 t e m p b u f f [ x ]= ’ \0 ’ ;
42 x =0;
43 whi le ( x<c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n )
44 {
45 b u f f e r [ x ]= t e m p b u f f [ x ] ;
46 x ++;
47 }
48 b u f f e r [ x ]= ’ \0 ’ ;
49 ∗ l e n = c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ;
50 e r r = p u t u s e r ( c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n , l e n ) ;
51
52 c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n =0;
53 c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x s t a r t =0 ;
54
55 p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” h e l l o wor ld !%s ” , b u f f e r ) ;
56 re turn e r r ;
57 }
58
59 a s m l i n k a g e long s y s c o v c h a n n e l w r i t e ( char∗ b u f f e r )
60 {
61 long e r r =0 ;
62 i f ( ( s t r l e n ( b u f f e r ) >= ( ( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t −
c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d + 1000) % 1000) ) &&
c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s )
63 re turn −1;
64
65 i n t x =0;
66 i n t b u f f e r x = c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d ;
67 f o r ( x =0; x< s t r l e n ( b u f f e r ) ; x ++)
68 {
69 c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f [ b u f f e r x ]= b u f f e r [ x ] ;
70 i f ( b u f f e r x +1==1000)
71 b u f f e r x =0;
72 e l s e
46
73 b u f f e r x ++;
74 }
75
76 c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d = ( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d + s t r l e n (
b u f f e r ) ) % 1000 ;
77 c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s =1;
78
79 p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” The wor ld h e l l o ” ) ;
80
81 re turn e r r ;
82 }
83
84 a s m l i n k a g e void s y s c o v c h a n n e l p e e r ( long add )
85 {
86 c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s =add ;
87 }
88 void c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e c e i v e d ( i n t package )
89 {
90 p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e v e i v e d −%d ” , package ) ;
91
92 i f ( c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ==1000)
93 re turn ;
94 c o v c h a n n e l r e c e i v e b u f [ c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ]= package ;
95 c o v c h a n n e l r e c i n d e x l e n ++;
96 }
97
98 i n t c h a n n e l g e t p a c k a g e t o s e n d ( void )
99 {
100 i f ( ! c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s )
101 re turn −1;
102 i n t p a c k e t = c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f [ c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t ] ;
103
104 c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f [ c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t ] = 0 ;
105 c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t =( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t +1) %
1000 ;
106 i f ( c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t == c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x e n d )
107 c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s =0;
108




112 i n t c h a n n e l p a c k e t c h e c k ( )
113 {
114 i f ( ! c h a n n e l h a s c o n t e n t s )
115 re turn −1;
116 re turn c o v c h a n n e l s e n d b u f [ c o v c h a n n e l s e n d i n d e x s t a r t ] ;
117 }
118
119 EXPORT SYMBOL( c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e c e i v e d ) ;
120 EXPORT SYMBOL( c h a n n e l g e t p a c k a g e t o s e n d ) ;
121 EXPORT SYMBOL( c h a n n e l p a c k e t c h e c k ) ;
A.2 tcp input.c
1 e x t e r n void c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e c e i v e d ( i n t package ) ;
2 e x t e r n i n t c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s ;
3
4 s t a t i c vo id t c p e v e n t d a t a r e c v ( s t r u c t sock ∗ sk , s t r u c t s k b u f f ∗ skb )
5 {
6 /∗ check i f t h e p a c k e t i s coming from t h e cov h o s t and i f i t ’ s
be tween t h e p a c k e t window ∗ /
7 /∗ T h i s i s t h e o n l y mod f o r r e c e i v e ∗ /
8 i f ( i n e t s k ( sk )−>daddr == c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s && skb−>l e n >= 1202 &&
skb−>l e n <=1400)
9 c h a n n e l p u t p a c k a g e r e c e i v e d ( skb−>l en −1202) ;
10
11 s t r u c t t c p s o c k ∗ t p = t c p s k ( sk ) ;
12 s t r u c t i n e t c o n n e c t i o n s o c k ∗ i c s k = i n e t c s k ( sk ) ;
13 u32 now ;
14
15 i n e t c s k s c h e d u l e a c k ( sk ) ;
16
17 t c p m e a s u r e r c v m s s ( sk , skb ) ;
18
19 t c p r c v r t t m e a s u r e ( t p ) ;
20
21 now = t c p t i m e s t a m p ;
22
23 i f ( ! i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o ) {
24 /∗ The f i r s t da ta p a c k e t r e c e i v e d , i n i t i a l i z e
25 ∗ d e l a y e d ACK e n g i n e .
26 ∗ /
48
27 t c p i n c r q u i c k a c k ( sk ) ;
28 i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o = TCP ATO MIN ;
29 } e l s e {
30 i n t m = now − i c s k−>i c s k a c k . l r c v t i m e ;
31
32 i f (m <= TCP ATO MIN / 2) {
33 /∗ The f a s t e s t cas e i s t h e f i r s t . ∗ /
34 i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o = ( i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o >> 1) +
TCP ATO MIN / 2 ;
35 } e l s e i f (m < i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o ) {
36 i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o = ( i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o >> 1) + m;
37 i f ( i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o > i c s k−> i c s k r t o )
38 i c s k−>i c s k a c k . a t o = i c s k−> i c s k r t o ;
39 } e l s e i f (m > i c s k−> i c s k r t o ) {
40 /∗ Too long gap . A p p a r e n t l y s e n d e r f a i l e d t o
41 ∗ r e s t a r t window , so t h a t we send ACKs q u i c k l y .
42 ∗ /
43 t c p i n c r q u i c k a c k ( sk ) ;
44 sk mem rec la im ( sk ) ;
45 }
46 }
47 i c s k−>i c s k a c k . l r c v t i m e = now ;
48
49 TCP ECN check ce ( tp , skb ) ;
50
51 i f ( skb−>l e n >= 128)




2 /∗ T h i s r o u t i n e w r i t e s p a c k e t s t o t h e ne twork . I t advances t h e
3 ∗ s e n d h e a d . T h i s happens as incoming acks open up t h e remote
4 ∗ window f o r us .
5 ∗
6 ∗ LARGESEND n o t e : ! t c p u r g m o d e i s o v e r k i l l , o n l y f r a m e s be tween
7 ∗ snd up −64k−mss . . snd up c a n n o t be l a r g e . However , t a k i n g i n t o
8 ∗ a c c o u n t r a r e use o f URG, t h i s i s n o t a b i g f l a w .
9 ∗
10 ∗ R e t u r n s 1 , i f no s e g m e n t s are i n f l i g h t and we have queued segments , b u t
49
11 ∗ c a n n o t send a n y t h i n g now because o f SWS or a n o t h e r problem .
12 ∗ /
13 e x t e r n i n t c h a n n e l g e t p a c k a g e t o s e n d ( ) ;
14 e x t e r n i n t c h a n n e l p a c k e t c h e c k ( ) ;
15 e x t e r n i n t c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d ;
16 e x t e r n i n t c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s ;
17
18 s t a t i c i n t t c p w r i t e x m i t ( s t r u c t sock ∗ sk , unsigned i n t mss now , i n t
nonagle ,
19 i n t push one , g f p t g fp )
20 {
21 s t r u c t t c p s o c k ∗ t p = t c p s k ( sk ) ;
22 s t r u c t s k b u f f ∗ skb ;
23 unsigned i n t t s o s e g s , s e n t p k t s ;
24 i n t cwnd quota ;
25 i n t r e s u l t ;
26
27 s t r u c t i n e t s o c k ∗ i n e t = i n e t s k ( sk ) ;
28
29 s e n t p k t s = 0 ;
30
31 /∗ l o c k t h e c h a n n e l i f n o t a l r e a d y l o c k e d ∗ /
32 i f ( ! sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l && ! c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d && i n e t −>daddr ==
c o v c h a n n e l a d d r e s s )
33 {
34 c o v c h a n n e l l o c k e d =1;
35 sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l =1;




40 i f ( ! push one ) {
41 /∗ Do MTU p r o b i n g . ∗ /
42 r e s u l t = t c p m t u p r o b e ( sk ) ;
43 i f ( ! r e s u l t ) {
44 re turn 0 ;
45 } e l s e i f ( r e s u l t > 0) {





50 i n t r e a l m s s =mss now ;
51 i n t p a c k e t =−1;
52 i n t x =0;
53 whi le ( ( skb = t c p s e n d h e a d ( sk ) ) ) {
54 x ++;
55 p a c k e t = c h a n n e l p a c k e t c h e c k ( ) ;
56 i n t p a c k e t u s e d =0;
57
58 /∗ g e t a v a l u e t o send and f o r m a t t h e mss v a l u e a c c o r d i n g l y
∗ /
59 i f ( sk−>i s c o v c h a n n e l && p a c k e t !=−1 && skb−>l e n > (1202+
p a c k e t ) )
60 {
61 p a c k e t u s e d =1;
62 p r i n t k (KERN EMERG ” p a c k a g e t o s e n d −%c −%d ” , packe t ,
p a c k e t ) ;
63 mss now = 1202 + p a c k e t ;
64 }
65 e l s e i f ( skb−>l e n >= 1202 && skb−>l e n <=1400)
66 mss now =1200;
67 e l s e
68 mss now= r e a l m s s ;
69
70
71 unsigned i n t l i m i t ;
72
73 t s o s e g s = t c p i n i t t s o s e g s ( sk , skb , mss now ) ;
74 BUG ON ( ! t s o s e g s ) ;
75
76 cwnd quota = t c p c w n d t e s t ( tp , skb ) ;
77 i f ( ! cwnd quota )
78 break ;
79
80 i f ( u n l i k e l y ( ! t c p s n d w n d t e s t ( tp , skb , mss now ) ) )
81 break ;
82
83 i f ( t s o s e g s == 1) {
84 i f ( u n l i k e l y ( ! t c p n a g l e t e s t ( tp , skb , mss now ,
85 ( t c p s k b i s l a s t ( sk ,
skb ) ?
86 n o n a g l e :
51
TCP NAGLE PUSH ) ) ) )
87 break ;
88 } e l s e {
89 i f ( p a c k e t ==−1 && ! push one && t c p t s o s h o u l d d e f e r




93 l i m i t = mss now ;
94 i f ( t s o s e g s > 1 && ! t c p u r g m o d e ( t p ) )
95 l i m i t = t c p m s s s p l i t p o i n t ( sk , skb , mss now ,
96 cwnd quota ) ;
97 i f ( p a c k e t !=−1)
98 l i m i t =mss now ;
99
100 i f ( skb−>l e n > l i m i t &&
101 u n l i k e l y ( t s o f r a g m e n t ( sk , skb , l i m i t , mss now ) ) )
102 break ;
103 TCP SKB CB ( skb )−>when = t c p t i m e s t a m p ;
104
105 /∗ remove from b u f f e r i f t h e p a c k e t was s e n t w i t h a c o v e r t
v a l u e ∗ /
106 i f ( p a c k e t u s e d )
107 p a c k e t = c h a n n e l g e t p a c k a g e t o s e n d ( ) ;
108 i f ( u n l i k e l y ( t c p t r a n s m i t s k b ( sk , skb , 1 , g fp ) ) )
109 break ;
110
111 /∗ Advance t h e s e n d h e a d . T h i s one i s s e n t o u t .
112 ∗ T h i s c a l l w i l l i n c r e m e n t p a c k e t s o u t .
113 ∗ /
114 t c p e v e n t n e w d a t a s e n t ( sk , skb ) ;
115
116 t c p m i n s h a l l u p d a t e ( tp , mss now , skb ) ;
117 s e n t p k t s ++;
118




123 i f ( l i k e l y ( s e n t p k t s ) ) {
124 t c p c w n d v a l i d a t e ( sk ) ;
52
125 re turn 0 ;
126 }
127 re turn ! tp−>p a c k e t s o u t && t c p s e n d h e a d ( sk ) ;
128 }
A.4 reader.c
1 # i n c l u d e < l i n u x / u n i s t d . h>
2 # i n c l u d e <s y s / s y s c a l l . h>
3 # i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
4 # i n c l u d e < s t r i n g . h>
5
6 long c h a n n e l r e a d ( char∗ b u f f e r , i n t ∗ l e n )
7 {
8 re turn s y s c a l l ( 3 3 7 , b u f f e r , l e n ) ;
9 }
10
11 long c h a n n e l w r i t e ( char∗ b u f f e r )
12 {
13 re turn s y s c a l l ( 3 3 8 , b u f f e r , s t r l e n ( b u f f e r ) ) ;
14 }
15
16 long c h a n n e l s e t p e e r ( long add )
17 {
18 re turn s y s c a l l ( 3 3 9 , add ) ;
19 }
20
21 i n t main ( )
22 {
23 c h a n n e l s e t p e e r (100837568) ;
24 i n t x =0;
25 char name [ ] = ” Hidden i n p l a i n s i g h t ” ;
26 char b u f f e r [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
27 i n t l e n =0;
28 long package = c h a n n e l w r i t e ( name ) ;
29 long e r r = c h a n n e l r e a d ( b u f f e r ,& l e n ) ;
30 p r i n t f ( ” from t h e network− %s \n ” , b u f f e r ) ;
31
32 re turn 1 ;
33 }
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B.1 PCAP Packet Length Extractor
1 # i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
2 # i n c l u d e <pcap . h>
3 # i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h>
4 # i n c l u d e <n e t i n e t / i p . h>
5 # i n c l u d e <a r p a / i n e t . h>
6
7 # d e f i n e ETHER TYPE IP (0 x0800 )
8 # d e f i n e ETHER TYPE 8021Q (0 x8100 )
9 # d e f i n e OFFSET (0xXXXFFF)
10 # d e f i n e NETMASK (0xXXXXX)
11
12 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗∗ a rgv )
13 {
14 s t r u c t p c a p p k t h d r h e a d e r ;
15 c o n s t u c h a r ∗ p a c k e t ;
16
17 i n t y =0;
18 char s r c i p [ 1 0 0 ] , d s t i p [ 1 0 0 ] ;
19
20 p c a p t ∗ h a n d l e ;
21 char e r r o r [ PCAP ERRBUF SIZE ] ;
22 h a n d l e = p c a p o p e n o f f l i n e ( a rgv [ y ] , e r r o r ) ;
23 i n t p a c k e t l e n g t h ;
24
25 whi le ( p a c k e t = p c a p n e x t ( hand le ,& h e a d e r ) ) {
26 u c h a r ∗ p a c k e t = ( u c h a r ∗ ) p a c k e t ;
27
28 i n t e t h e r n e t t y p e = ( ( i n t ) ( p a c k e t [ 1 2 ] ) << 8) | ( i n t ) p a c k e t [ 1 3 ] ;
29
30 i f ( e t h e r n e t t y p e == ETHER TYPE IP )
31 {
32 p a c k e t += 1 4 ;
33 s t r u c t i p ∗ i p h d r = ( s t r u c t i p ∗ ) p a c k e t ;
34 s t r u c t i p h d r ∗ i p h e a d e r = ( s t r u c t i p ∗ ) p a c k e t ;
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35
36 p a c k e t l e n g t h = n t o h s ( i p h d r−> i p l e n ) ;
37
38 i f ( p a c k e t l e n g t h > 55 && p a c k e t l e n g t h < 1500 &&
39 ( ( i p h e a d e r −>s a d d r&OFFSET ) ==NETMASK | |
40 ( i p h e a d e r −>daddr&OFFSET ) ==NETMASK) )
41 {




46 p c a p c l o s e ( h a n d l e ) ;
47 re turn 0 ;
48 }
B.2 Network Packet Reader
1 # i n c l u d e <pcap . h>
2 # i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
3 # i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h>
4 # i n c l u d e <e r r n o . h>
5 # i n c l u d e <s y s / s o c k e t . h>
6 # i n c l u d e <n e t i n e t / i n . h>
7 # i n c l u d e <n e t i n e t / i p . h>
8 # i n c l u d e <a r p a / i n e t . h>
9 # i n c l u d e <n e t i n e t / i f e t h e r . h>
10 # d e f i n e ETHER TYPE IP (0 x0800 )
11 # d e f i n e ETHER TYPE 8021Q (0 x8100 )
12 # d e f i n e OFFSET (0 xF8FFFF )
13 / / # d e f i n e NETMASK (0 xA8C0 )
14 # d e f i n e NETMASK (0 x6814AC )
15
16 void c a l l b a c k ( u c h a r ∗ u s e l e s s , c o n s t s t r u c t p c a p p k t h d r ∗ header , c o n s t u c h a r
∗
17 p k t p t r )
18 {
19 i f ( ( ( ( i n t ) ( p k t p t r [ 1 2 ] ) << 8) | ( i n t ) p k t p t r [ 1 3 ] ) == ETHER TYPE IP )
20 {
21 p k t p t r += 1 4 ; / / s k i p p a s t t h e E t h e r n e t I I header
22 s t r u c t i p ∗ i p h d r = ( s t r u c t i p ∗ ) p k t p t r ; / / p o i n t t o an IP header
s t r u c t u r e
56
23 s t r u c t i p h d r ∗ i p h e a d e r = ( s t r u c t i p ∗ ) p k t p t r ; / / p o i n t t o an IP
header s t r u c t u r e
24
25 i n t p a c k e t l e n g t h = n t o h s ( i p h d r−> i p l e n ) ;
26
27 i f ( p a c k e t l e n g t h > 55 && p a c k e t l e n g t h < 1500 &&
28 ( ( i p h e a d e r −>s a d d r&OFFSET ) ==NETMASK | |
29 ( i p h e a d e r −>daddr&OFFSET ) ==NETMASK) )
30 {





36 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗∗ a rgv )
37 {
38 char e r r [ PCAP ERRBUF SIZE ] ;
39
40 d e s c r = p c a p o p e n l i v e ( ” e t h 0 ” ,100 ,0 , −1 , e r r b u f ) ;
41 i f ( d e s c r == NULL)
42 {
43 p r i n t f ( ” p c a p o p e n l i v e ( ) : %s \n ” , e r r ) ; e x i t ( 1 ) ;
44 }
45
46 p c a p l o o p ( d e s c r ,−1 , c a l l b a c k ,NULL) ;
47
48 re turn 0 ;
49 }
B.3 Batch Collection Files to MySQL loader
1 # ! / b i n / bash
2
3 f r o n t =” l o a d d a t a i n f i l e ’ / home / d e r e k / Documents / NPS / t h e s i s / pcap \ d a t a / o c t 2 0 /
”
4 back=” ’ i n t o t a b l e r a w d a t a FIELDS TERMINATED BY ’ ’ IGNORE 1 LINES ; ” ;
5
6 f o r X i n ∗ t x t
7 do
8 echo $f ron t$X$back
9 done
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1 −− MySQL dump 10 .13 D i s t r i b 5 . 1 . 5 2 , f o r pc−l i n u x −gnu ( x86 64 )
2 −−
3 −− Host : l o c a l h o s t Database : p a c l e n
4 −− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5 −− S e r v e r v e r s i o n 5.1.52 − l o g
6
7 /∗ !40101 SET @OLD CHARACTER SET CLIENT=@@CHARACTER SET CLIENT ∗ / ;
8 /∗ !40101 SET @OLD CHARACTER SET RESULTS=@@CHARACTER SET RESULTS ∗ / ;
9 /∗ !40101 SET @OLD COLLATION CONNECTION=@@COLLATION CONNECTION ∗ / ;
10 /∗ !40101 SET NAMES u t f 8 ∗ / ;
11 /∗ !40103 SET @OLD TIME ZONE=@@TIME ZONE ∗ / ;
12 /∗ !40103 SET TIME ZONE= ’+00:00 ’ ∗ / ;
13 /∗ !40014 SET @OLD UNIQUE CHECKS=@@UNIQUE CHECKS, UNIQUE CHECKS=0 ∗ / ;
14 /∗ !40014 SET @OLD FOREIGN KEY CHECKS=@@FOREIGN KEY CHECKS ,
FOREIGN KEY CHECKS=0 ∗ / ;
15 /∗ !40101 SET @OLD SQL MODE=@@SQL MODE, SQL MODE=’NO AUTO VALUE ON ZERO ’ ∗ / ;
16 /∗ !40111 SET @OLD SQL NOTES=@@SQL NOTES, SQL NOTES=0 ∗ / ;
17
18 −−
19 −− Tab le s t r u c t u r e f o r t a b l e ‘ ave ‘
20 −−
21
22 /∗ !40101 SET @ s a v e d c s c l i e n t = @ @ c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t ∗ / ;
23 /∗ !40101 SET c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t = u t f 8 ∗ / ;
24 CREATE TABLE ‘ ave ‘ (
25 ‘ len ‘ i n t ( 1 1 ) NOT NULL,
26 ‘ ave ‘ b i g i n t ( 2 0 ) u n s i g n e d NOT NULL,
27 ‘ s t d e v ‘ b i g i n t ( 2 0 ) u n s i g n e d NOT NULL,
28 ‘ hour ‘ i n t ( 1 1 ) NOT NULL,
29 PRIMARY KEY ( ‘ l en ‘ , ‘ hour ‘ )
30 ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET= u t f 8 ;




34 −− Tab le s t r u c t u r e f o r t a b l e ‘ count ‘
35 −−
36
37 /∗ !40101 SET @ s a v e d c s c l i e n t = @ @ c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t ∗ / ;
38 /∗ !40101 SET c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t = u t f 8 ∗ / ;
39 CREATE TABLE ‘ count ‘ (
40 ‘ timestamp ‘ b i g i n t ( 2 0 ) u n s i g n e d NOT NULL,
41 ‘ len ‘ i n t ( 1 1 ) NOT NULL,
42 ‘ c o u n t e r ‘ b i g i n t ( 2 0 ) u n s i g n e d NOT NULL,
43 PRIMARY KEY ( ‘ timestamp ‘ , ‘ l en ‘ )
44 ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET= u t f 8 ;




49 −− Tab le s t r u c t u r e f o r t a b l e ‘ rawdata ‘
50 −−
51
52 /∗ !40101 SET @ s a v e d c s c l i e n t = @ @ c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t ∗ / ;
53 /∗ !40101 SET c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t = u t f 8 ∗ / ;
54 CREATE TABLE ‘ rawdata ‘ (
55 ‘ timestamp ‘ b i g i n t ( 2 0 ) u n s i g n e d NOT NULL,
56 ‘ len ‘ i n t ( 1 1 ) NOT NULL
57 ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET= u t f 8 ;
58 /∗ !40101 SET c h a r a c t e r s e t c l i e n t = @ s a v e d c s c l i e n t ∗ / ;
C.2 Setting Standard Deviation Multiple
1 update ave3 s e t c s t d =1 where max > 2000000;
2 update ave3 s e t c s t d =2 where max > 400000 and c s t d =0;
3 update ave3 s e t c s t d =5 where max > 100000 and c s t d =0;
4 update ave3 s e t c s t d =8 where max > 50000 and c s t d =0;
5 update ave3 s e t c s t d =30 where s t d e v < 50 and ave < 150 and c s t d =0;
6 update ave3 s e t c s t d =25 where s t d e v > 1000 and ave > 2000 and c s t d =0;
7 update ave3 s e t c s t d =30 where ( l e n < 300 or l e n > 1399) and c s t d =0;
8 update ave3 s e t c s t d =25 where ave > 200 and l e n > 600 and l e n < 900 and
c s t d =0;
9 update ave3 s e t c s t d =25 where ave > 250 and l e n > 400 and l e n < 600 and
c s t d =0;
10 update ave3 s e t c s t d =20 where ave > 500 and l e n > 1150 and l e n < 1300 and
c s t d =0;
60
11 update ave3 s e t c s t d =10 where c s t d =0;
61
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